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Abstract
In this paper we examine if partners in households coordinate their
working times. Also we examine how this coordination influences the
(in)formal demand for child care and the time spent on joint activities.
The activities that we distinguish are the time that partners spent to-
gether, spent jointly on household tasks and spent jointly on child care.
We find that partners de-synchronize their work times when there are
children present in the household while they synchronize their work times
when there are no children present in the household. Households where
women are higher educated tend to synchronize there work times.
Partners who synchronize their work times spent more joint hours on
household tasks. Partners who de-synchronize their work times less spent
more time together. We do not find a relation between work timing and
the time that parents spent together caring for their children.
The demand for (in)formal child care is affected by the coordination of
work schedules by partners. Partners who de-synchronize their work times
more, demand less (in)formal child care. Moreover, active work time de-
synchronization and the demand for child care appear to be substitutes.
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1 Introduction
The hours of labor that individuals supply on the labor market in multi-person
households depend on the income that is generated by working a certain amount
of hours on the labor market and on the extent to which partners are capable of
adjusting their work schedules. While there is general consensus that the timing
of work is important when discussing labor supply decisions (see Hamermesh
(1996, 2002), Sullivan (1996), Hallberg (2003), Jenkins & Osberg (2005) and
Van Klaveren & Maassen van den Brink (2007)), most studies examine this
timing aspect in a rather descriptive manner.
In this paper we examine if partners actively coordinate their work sched-
ules and, if so, how this active work time coordination influences the demand
for child care and the time spent on joint activities. Moreover this study sheds
light on how the coordination of work times influences labor supply choices.
This information is of economic importance when considering policies regard-
ing child care, female labor supply, fertility and the flexibility of work times.
Furthermore, it contributes to a better understanding of the labor supply deci-
sion process within households given that labor supply decisions of partners are
interdependent.
In general there are two circumstances that determine the extent to which
partners coordinate their work schedules and if partners synchronize or de-
synchronize their work times.
The first circumstance is the presence of (young) children. Partners can
take care of the children themselves but can also choose to outsource child care
tasks to the market or to family/friends. Since in the Netherlands formal child
care is expensive we hypothesize that partners with (more) children actively
de-synchronize their work hours in order to reduce the child care costs. The
correlation between how partners coordinate their work times and the demand
for informal child care is less clear. On the one hand we would expect that
informal child care can be a cheaper substitute for formal child care and hence
when formal child care becomes more expensive, partners substitute formal
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child care for informal child care. In this case work time coordination and the
demand for informal child care need not to be correlated. However, generally
partners prefer to spend (at least a certain amount of) time with their children
and have an intrinsic motivation to provide child care themselves. In this case
partners demand less informal and formal child care by de-synchronizing their
work times.
The second circumstance that is underlying the active coordination of work
times is the time that is jointly spent on certain activities. We distinguish three
joint activities, namely, joint time with the partner, joint child care time and
joint time spent on household tasks. In general partners without children have a
preference for togetherness and as a consequence they are likely to synchronize
their work times in order to spend more leisure time together. Partners might
also synchronize their work times such that they can jointly perform household
tasks. Furthermore it is likely that partners with children prefer to spend time
together with all household members and hence synchronize their work times.
Consequently we expect that the joint child care time for these households is
higher.
The estimate that measures the effect of partner’s coordinating their work
schedules itself, should not contain ‘factors of society’ that might play a role
and hence we distinguish a ’society’-effect and an ’active-coordination’-effect.
We notice that in this paper the main focus is on the latter component. In
order to capture the ’active-coordination’ effect we use a methodology that was
developed in an earlier paper by Klaveren & Maassen van den Brink (2007).
The outline of this paper is a follows. In section 2 we describe the data
that are used. In section 3 the matching procedure is explained and simulation
results are discussed. In section 4 we examine how the coordination of work
schedules influences the time that is spent on joint activities and the demand
for (in)formal child care. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data
The data are from the so-called NIPO Post initial Schooling Survey that were
collected in December 2005. The data are collected by TNS NIPO (The Dutch
Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research). This is the third round of
a cross-section survey which was first administered in 1999. While the first two
rounds were held by telephone, this survey was held using the internet.
The data are a cross-section of the Dutch population aged from 16 to 64.
Questions are asked concerning various background characteristics such as age,
gender, formal education and employment status. In the 2005 wave several ques-
tions are asked related to to how respondents coordinate their work schedules
with their partner, if they had one. In this study we use data of 1830 couples
for which holds that both partners are performing paid work.
In order to obtain accurate work time information we asked respondents and
their partners on which days they work during the week and on what time they
start and end their working days.
-Insert Figure 1 & 2 about here-
Figure 1 and 2 shows a graph of the work timing of men and women. The
y-axis indicates the fraction of males/females that work on hour i of the day,
where i is 1 up to 24, since there are 24 hours in a day. Notice that, for example,
hour 9 on the x-axis indicate the ninth hour and this refers to the fraction of
males/females that begin their work day between 8 and 9 o’clock. The average
work timing of the male is indicated by a straight line while the average work
timing of the female is indicated by a dotted line.
As expected for the Netherlands, the fraction of employed women is smaller
compared to that of men. Furthermore, we observe that the fraction of women
that is active on the labor market is largest between 10 am and 11 am and de-
creases afterwards. The fraction of employed men appears to be rather constant
between 8 am and 5 pm. Furthermore, not many persons work on a Saturday
or Sunday which is as expected. In table 1 the descriptive statistics on working
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days and working hours per week are reported for men and women separately.
-Insert Table 1 about here-
From the descriptive statistics in table 1 and figure 1 and 2 it is clear that
men are mostly full-time workers. About 83 percent of the males performs paid
labor for 5 days per week or more and the average working hours per week
is 44.2. This explains the constant fraction of males that is observed in the
graphs. Women are in many cases part-time workers since about 65 percent of
the females work 4 days per week or less and the average amount of labor hours
is 27.14.
Why do we observe the work time patterns in figure 1 and 2, given the
number of hours that individuals choose to work on the market? A first expla-
nation that can be given is that individuals with more similar characteristics,
like education, age etc., find jobs that are accompanied with more similar work
schedules. A second explanation that can be given is that partners actively co-
ordinate their work schedules such that it fits their personal situation best. For
example, partners without children might aim at working as much simultaneous
hours (synchronized work hours) on the market as is possible since this will
increase their potential joint leisure time. However, partners with (young) chil-
dren might de-synchronize their work hours in order to avoid the expensive day
care. The first explanation can be seen as an external mechanism that ’silently
forces’ partners to work at certain hours. The second explanation can be seen
as an internal mechanism which is the result of a decision process where two
partners try to adapt their work situation as much as possible to their personal
lives and preferences.
In order to examine to what extent partners actively synchronize their work
hours we examined their work schedules. The descriptive statistics are shown
in table 2.
-Insert Table 2 about here-
More than 50 percent of the men and women in the sample state that it
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is possible to a large extent to influence the time on which they start (end)
working. These partners have opportunities to actively coordinate their work
schedules.
Respondents are also asked if they already had their jobs when they started
living together. The descriptive statistics are given in table 3.
-Insert Table 3 about here-
There is a large fraction of men and women that already had their job before
they started living together. These (fe)males are not able to coordinate their
work schedules by job choice. Hence if there is a preference for coordinating
work schedules then this can only be possible if partners are flexible in choosing
their own work times. If these partners are also not or almost not flexible in
choosing their own work times then coordination of work schedules is difficult
or even not possible.
In order to examine what are the determinants of the amount of work time
overlap, we regress the total number of weekly work time overlap hours on
certain individual and household characteristics. The work time overlap mea-
sure is defined as the number of hours that both partners work on the market
simultaneously per week.
Notice that since we have asked partners to fill in their work times for each
day of the week we do not need to assume that partners synchronize their work
schedules from the perspective of a daily dimension (as is the case in Jenkins
& Osberg (2005), Hallberg (2003) and van Klaveren & Maassen van den Brink
(2007)). In this paper, we allow for the fact that partners might (de-)synchronize
their work schedules on a weekly basis, which is more realistic.
The explanatory variables are the number of children between certain age in-
tervals, the weekly working hours of males and females, a dummy that indicates
1 if (fe)males had their job before they started living together, the education
level, a set of dummies that indicate 1 if the (fe)male has paid employment on
a certain day, the degree of work time flexibility and a set of dummies that
indicate where partners of households have met each other at the beginning of
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the relationship. The results are reported in table 4.
-Insert Table 4 about here-
If there are children present in the household partners tend to have less work
time overlap. These partners have either actively de-synchronized their work
times or these partners chose to work less hours on the labor market which likely
decreases the hours of possible work time overlap. The latter is confirmed by
various studies (See Hamermesh (2000), Hallberg (2003) and van Velzen (2001)).
When (fe)males work more hours on the labor market they are more likely
to have more overlap in work hours.
The education variable indicates the highest attained education level and is
an ordinal variable. The lowest education level is primary education and the
highest education level is having a university degree. The amount of work time
overlap is positively correlated with the education level of both male and female.
Higher educated individuals are likely to be more flexible in choosing their work
times and usually provide more labor hours which results in more work time
overlap. Since we have information on the degree to which (fe)males are able
to determine their own work times we can obtain the correlation coefficient
between the degree of work time flexibility and education level. The correlation
coefficient is 0.29 for males and 0.07 for females. For females it seems that the
education level and the degree to which females can freely choose their work
times are not highly correlated.
The degree to which (fe)males are able to determine their own work times
does enter significantly in the work overlap equation indicating that partners
who can self-determine their work times have more work time overlap, which is
as expected.
Since there is selection into marriage it is possible that we find more work
time overlap for individuals who started their relationship, for example, at work.
In this case the causality is reversed and the higher work time overlap is then due
to ’factors of society’. We see that none of the dummies, that give information
on where partners have met each other, influences the amount of work time
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overlap significantly. It is worthwhile to notice that the place were individuals
have met each other is very diverse. We expected that the group of partners
that met each other at work would be large and that we would observe more
work overlap hours for them. From table 3 we can divert that from our sample
11.97 % ( 219∗1001829 ) have met at work.
3 Matching procedure and simulation results
In order to examine if partners actively coordinate their work schedules we sim-
ulate a control group (see van Klaveren and Maassen van den Brink (2007)). It
should hold that the ’partners’ of this control group time their work schedules ac-
cording to outside factors and not according to the preferences of spouse/partner.
Based on characteristics that influence the amount of work time overlap we
match each couple in our sample to another couple from the sample. Then the
couples switch partners with the matched couples such that we have two new
couples, which we refer to as the control group (C1 and C2). Notice that while
the control group couples have about similar characteristics as the couple from
our sample, they cannot coordinated their work schedules.
In order to test if partners actively coordinate their work schedules and hence
synchronize their work times we do the following:
1. Compare the timing of market work of the couples in our sample with that
of the matched couples.
2. Compare the timing of market work of the couples in our sample with that
of the control group.
When we compare the timing of market work between the couples in our
sample with that of the matched couples we should find no significant differ-
ence. Given that 1 is satisfied, finding a significant difference in the timing of
market work between the couples in our sample with the control group couples
is empirical support that partners actively coordinate their work schedules.
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In order to match couples to other couples from the sample Mahalanobis
distances are used1. When using Mahalanobis distances, the matched couples
can be regarded as the nearest neighbors of couples in our sample. In other
words, when we match a couple based on certain covariates to a couple in the
sample, it should not be possible find another couple in the sample that is
even more similar. A formal explanation of the matching procedure is given in
Appendix A.
The matching variables used to define the Mahalanobis distances are those
variables that are significant in the work time overlap regression (see table 4).2
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the matching variables and the work
time overlap variable for the couples in our sample and the matched couples.
-Insert Table 5 about here-
The couples have about similar descriptive statistics compared to the matched
couples. The mean differences of the matching variables are all insignificant with
the exception of the degree to which females can freely choose their work times.
Although this difference is significant, the difference is small. The mean work
time overlap between couples and matched couples is not significantly different
from zero and hence the amount of work time overlap that is caused by ’factors
of society’ is likely to be similar.
Comparing work time overlap of couples with that of the control group
In order to examine how partners actively coordinate their work times we use
the following estimation strategy. First we regress the work time overlap of the
couples in our sample and the control group3 separately on a set of dummies
representing certain individual and household characteristics. These dummy
variables are related to the presence of children, the education level, the (gross)
1See Rubin (1979)
2Notice that we do not include the individual wage rates. This is because many individuals
did not report their gross income and these couples would then drop out of the sample in the
matching procedure. By including the number of labor hours and the education level for both
male and female we assume that we (at least partly) capture the income effect.
3Actually, the control group exists out of two couples. Hence we define work time overlap
as the average work time overlap of two control groups.
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household income and the extent to which men and women can choose their
own work times. The estimates that are obtained are used to determine how
different characteristics on average influence the amount of work time overlap
for the couples in our sample and the control group. Comparing these averages
can then be interpreted as the difference in work time overlap that is caused by
active work time coordination of couples in our sample. The estimation results
are shown in table 6.
-Insert Table 6 about here-
The mean work time overlap is denoted as WTO. Furthermore ∆ is the
difference in mean work time overlap between the couples and the control group.
Partners without children tend to synchronize their work times and have
potentially 2.25 hours per week more joint leisure time compared to parents
who have at least one child. When there are children present in the household
between 0 and 12, parents de-synchronize their work hours by about 2.5 hours
per week. Parents also de-synchronize their work times when there is at least
one child present who is 12 years old or older, but the effect smaller.
The education level of men does not influence the amount of work time
overlap while the education level of women does. Households where women
have a high education level, tend to have on average 1.26 hours more work time
overlap due to coordination. Households where woman have a low or medium
education level have less work time overlap than the control group. This suggest
that these households are de-synchronizing their work times. In general, lower
educated females have more children and have children at a younger age. Hence
the observed effect is likely to be a de-synchronization effect due to the presence
of children in the household.
When the household income is high (medium, low) there is positive (nega-
tive) effect on the amount of work time overlap due to coordination. Household
income is divided in three categories. The intervals of respectively the first, sec-
ond and third household income category are (0,45000], (45000,68000], and >
68000. The numbers are representing the gross yearly household income mea-
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sured in Euros’. We notice that the income variable contains many missing
values.4
Males and females who can determine their working times to a large extent
have significantly more work time overlap compared to the control group. How-
ever, although we do find this effect for males and females who can completely
control their own work schedules this effect is smaller. It is likely that a person
with a responsible job is allowed to determine his or her own work schedule but
cannot alter the amount of work time overlap since he or she has to work more
labor hours. The estimation results suggest that households where individuals
can not easily determine their own work times de-synchronize their work times.
4 Coordination of work schedules and the influ-
ence on joint activities and the demand for
child care
Households without children, households where the female is higher educated
and where partners have more freedom in choosing there own work times, syn-
chronize their work times more than other household do. However, the question
that remains is: ”what happens with these synchronized hours?”. It can be hy-
pothesized that partners who actively synchronize their work hours have more
potential hours available to perform joint activities. In this section we will ex-
amine how work time adjustment influences the amount of time that is spent
on joint activities.
Furthermore, the results from table 6 indicate that the presence of (young)
children influence how partners adjust their work schedules. Partners without
children tend to be work time synchronizers, while partners with children tend
to be work time de-synchronizers. We hypothesize that the amount to which
partners are able to (de-)synchronize their work times will have an effect on the
4Because of these missing values we replaced the records by zero and added a dummy in
the regression equation, indicating 1 when the information on household income was missing
and 0 otherwise.
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amount of (in)formal child care that households demand.
The allocation of (de-)synchronized work hours on joint activities
We will make a distinction between partners that synchronize their work times
and those who de-synchronize their work times. In order to do so so we estimate
the following OLS equation:
Orc = α0 + α1 ·OC1 + α2 ·OC2 +  (1)
Where O stands for the work time overlap of respectively the couples in our
sample and the two control couples. The variation in Orc caused by coordina-
tion of work schedules is then captured by the -term. If the -term > 0 we
refer to this household as synchronizers and if the -term < 0 we refer to this
household as de-synchronizers. In the remainder of this section we will refer to
the synchronizers as type S households and to the de-synchronizers as type D
households.
Respondents are asked how many hours per week they spent on joint house-
hold tasks, joint care for the child(ren) and leisure time with the partner. We
focus first on the hours that partners jointly spent on household tasks. No-
tice that some partners may simply spent more hours on household tasks than
other households and the observed joint household hours are influenced by this
amount of hours. Hence we express the Relative Joint Household Hours (rjhh)
as:
rjhh =
2 · jhh
Σfi=mhhi
(2)
where jhh stands for the the amount of time that partners spent jointly
in the household and hh stands for the individual household hours for i =
m(ale), f(emale). The Relative Joint Household Hours is defined as the time
that partners spent together performing household activities (times 2) relative
to the sum of individual household hours.
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In table 7 the mean work time overlap of the couples (WTOCouples) is com-
pared with that of the control couples( WTOControl) by means of a t-test. We
distinguish type D households from type S households and distinguish different
intervals of relative joint household time.
-Insert Table 7 about here-
The estimation results suggest that 30 % of the total household time is spent
jointly. From the WTOCouples-numbers we can conclude that an increase in the
number of hours of work time overlap is accompanied with an increase in the
amount of joint household time. However this observed effect can be due to fac-
tors of society or active synchronization of work schedules. From the differences
in mean work time overlap between the couples in our sample and the control
group we can infer that a higher degree of synchronized (or less de-synchronized)
work times leads to more joint household time. Apparently, partners who syn-
chronize their work times are likely to synchronize their household tasks at least
to a certain extent.
The effect of work time adjustment on the joint hours spent on child care
can be examined in a similar way as we did with joint household hours. First
we express the relative joint child care hours (rjch) as:
rjch =
2 · jch
Σfi=mchi
(3)
where ch stands for the individual child care hours for i = m(ale), f(emale).
The expectation is that for type D households we observe less joint child care
time as household de-synchronize their work times more. Also we expect that
the number of type S households will be smaller than the number of type D
households.
Table 8 gives the t-test results where we compare the mean work time overlap
of couples with that of the control group separately for type D and type S
households, subdivided into intervals that indicate the fraction of the total child
care time that is spent jointly.
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-Insert Table 8 about here-
The estimation results do not confirm our expectations that less joint child
care time is observed as households de-synchronize more. From table 8 it ap-
pears that the amount of joint child care time is not influenced by the extent
to which partners (de-)synchronize their work times. The reason might be that
parents usually do not perform synchronous care activities. This does not have
to be the case when there are young children present in the household. Unfor-
tunately our sample is not large enough to perform a t-test on the sub sample
where parents have 2 or more young children. In general we do not find evidence
that active coordination of work schedules influences the amount of joint child
care time.
Although it is not possible to transform the joint time that is spent with the
partner into fractions it is possible to use an different approach to examine the
influence of coordinated work schedules on the weekly amount of hours that is
spent with the partner.5
Consider the following equation:
tp,i = β0 + ΣJj=1βj ·Xj,i + βj+1 · ˆi + µi (4)
The left hand side variable is the number of hours that partners spent with
each other. This variable is regressed on individual and household characteristics
and on the earlier defined ˆ-term that was estimated in (1). The characteristics
that are used are the number of children between certain age intervals, income
level, the education level of male and female and the ˆ-term. The ˆ-term should
capture the variation of work time overlap that is caused by active coordination
of work schedules.
We would expect that partners try to synchronize their work schedules in
order to spend more time with each other. However, it is expected that this is
easier for type S households than for type D households. In table 9 we show the
5We notice that this estimation approach can also be done with joint household time and
joint child care time. However, the findings are similar compared to the t-test results.
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estimation results where the logarithm of joint time is regressed on the earlier
mentioned covariates for both household types separately.
-Insert Table 9 about here-
The households that are defined as synchronizers spend on average more
hours per week with the partner as is expected. Surprisingly, ˆ is significant for
type D households, while it is not significant for type S households. In general
partners with children are de-synchronizers and they may have a stronger pref-
erence for togetherness since the time together with the partner is more scarce
compared to partners without children.
The significance of the other explanatory variables are very similar for both
household types. The presence of children in the household negatively influences
the time that partners spent with each other. Households were men have a
higher education level have less joint leisure time with the partner.
In general, the estimations results suggest that average work time synchro-
nization influences the amount of time that is jointly spent on household tasks
and the amount of time that de-synchronizers spent together with the partner.
This togetherness effect is not found for synchronizing partners. The t-test re-
sults indicate that active coordination does not influence the amount of time
that is jointly spent on child care activities.
Work time adjustment and the demand for child care
In this section we use the sub-sample of households that make use of informal
or formal child care. The household decision process regarding the demand for
formal and informal child care is complicated, since it is likely that partners
simultaneously decide on the quantity of (in)formal child care hours and the
labor hours they will provide. Moreover, the decision to enter the labor market
and the use of child care is interrelated.
For simplicity we assume that partners decide in the first stage how many
hours of child care is needed given the amount of labor hours they provide. In
the second stage partners decide on who will be the provider of the child care.
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We do allow for interdependency, in the sense that we hypothesize that partners
can coordinate their work hours in the second stage which can lead to a more
favorable outcome for the household. For example, if parents de-synchronize
their work times, they themselves can provide more child care hours and hence
they need less (in)formal child care. Another explanation related to informal
child care is that partners might coordinate their work schedules with that of
family members who take care of the child(ren). In this case partners that
synchronize their work times might demand more informal child care.
In order to examine how the coordination of work schedules influences the
demand for (in)formal child care we estimate the following equation:
tlcc,i = δ0 + Σ
k
k=1δk ·Xk,i + δk+1 · ˆi + µi (5)
where ticc is the demand for child care per month for l = f (ormal child
care), i(nformal child care). The explanatory variables are the price of one hour
(in)formal child care, the number of children between certain age intervals, the
education level of male and female, the logarithm of household income, a dummy
that indicates 1 if a certain household makes use of formal and informal child
care and the ˆ-term. The estimation results are printed in table 10.
-Insert Table 10 about here-
An increase of the hourly price of formal child care decreases the demand
for formal child care. This effect is not found for informal child care, although
the sign is negative and the t-value is close to being marginally significant.
Furthermore, when partners demand both formal and informal child care we see
that the demand for formal child care or informal child care is less compared to
parters who use only formal or informal child care.
For higher educated women the demand for formal child care increases while
the demand for informal child care decreases. As is expected and found in many
studies is that higher educated outsource child care.
Families with higher educated men tend to use more hours of informal child
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care. We do not observe a relationship between the education level of men and
the demand for formal child care. Higher educated men work more hours on
the labor market and the estimation results suggest that the extra amount of
child care that is needed is at least partly provided through informal child care.
The presence of children between 0 and 3 increases the demand for (in)formal
child care as is expected. The presence of children between 4 and 12 negatively
influences the demand for (in)formal child care. This is explained by the fact
that in the Netherlands, children go to school when they are 4 years old.
We are particularly interested in the correlation between the ˆ-term and
the amount of formal and informal child care. The ˆ-term enters significantly
in both equations. The positive sign is as expected, since if partners syn-
chronize their work hours more, this diminishes the time that one of the two
partners is at home. Hence the demand for (in)formal child care is less for
de-synchronizing households compared to synchronizing households. For house-
holds where work times are de-synchronized it holds that when work times are
more de-synchronized the demand for child care will diminish. In other words,
work time de-synchronization and the demand for child care are substitutes.
Table 11 shows the summary statistics on the number of (in)formal child
care hours that households demand.
-Insert Table 11 about here-
Consider the ˆ coefficient of 0.013 from the formal child care regression and
the mean formal child care that is demanded of 63.84 hours per month from
table 11. This means that if partners synchronize their work times one hour
more per week, they will on average demand 1.3 %·63.24 = 0.82 hours more
formal child care per month. Doing the same for informal child care, we obtain
that if partners synchronize their work times one hour more per week, they will
need 0.8 hours more informal child care per month. On average partners with
children de-synchronize their work times and the amount of synchronization
influences the demand for (in)formal child care.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the coordination of working times within the house-
hold. Also we examine how the coordination of work schedules influences the
(in)formal demand for child care and the time spent on joint activities. The
activities that we distinguish are the time that partners spent together, spent
jointly on household tasks and spent jointly on child care.
We find that partners actively coordinate their work schedules. Partners
that have children between 0 and 12 years old on average de-synchronize their
work times with 2.5 hours per week. Parents who have children of 12 years old
or older also tend to de-synchronize but the effect is smaller. Partners without
children tend to synchronize their work times with 2.25 hours per week. House-
holds where females are higher educated have on average 1.26 hours more work
time overlap compared to the control group. Although we find that more work
time flexibility leads to more work time synchronization or less work time de-
synchronization, this effect is not found for persons who can entirely determine
their own work times.
When partners synchronize their work times they tend to perform more
household tasks jointly. De-synchronizers spent more time together when they
de-synchronize their work times less. There is no empirical evidence that the
coordination of work times and the time that parents spent together caring for
their children are correlated.
From our study it can be deducted that the demand for (in)formal child care
is affected by the coordination of work schedules by partners. Partners who
de-synchronize their work times more, demand less (in)formal child care. Work
time de-synchronization and the demand for child care appear to be substitutes.
Two-earner household obviously de-synchronize their work times in order to
reduce the child care costs.
The latter result is interesting considering the Dutch labor market policy.
Based on our results we state that labor market policies should make the co-
ordination of work schedules easier. This influences both child care costs and
18
’togetherness’ within households. For two-earner households with children it is
usually the case that females are part time workers. Stimulating the possibility
of ’working at home’ for both men and women gives both partners the oppor-
tunity to reduce the expensive child care costs and might induce women to work
more hours for their employer. An additional effect is that in both cases the
household income will increase. We stress the importance of these labor market
policies since they are likely to be cheaper than subsidizing child care itself, as
the government policy currently does.
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Appendix A
This appendix shows how couples are matched to other couples from the sam-
ple with nearest available pair matching using the Mahalanobis distance (for a
more elaborate explanation see Rubin (1979)). For simplicity we show how this
matching procedure works for one household using the similar notation as in
Rubin (1979).
Let the sample G1 of couples have sample size N1 and let the sample of
couples that can be matched have sample size N2, where N2 = N1− 1. Nearest
available pair matching first orders the G1 units and then matches each unit of
G1 to the closest unit of G2.
xi is the Ni×p data matrix of X based on the random sample Gi for i = 1, 2.
x¯i is the 1× p sample mean vector in Gi. The pooled within sample covariance
matrix of X based on the random samples is then:
S =
[(x T1 x1 −N1 · x¯ T1 x¯1) + (x T2 x2 −N2 · x¯ T2 x¯2)]
(N1 +N2 − 2) (6)
The Mahalanobis distance between a unit from the sample G1 with score X1
and a unit from sample G1 with score X2 is then defined as:
(X1 −X2)S −1(X1 −X2)T (7)
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This algorithm matches a couple from the sample G2 to a couple from the
sample G1 for which holds that the Mahalanobis distance has the smallest value
compared to all other possible matches. Notice that this procedure is repeated
for each household in the sample, where the -1 from N2 = N1 − 1 is the couple
that is excluded from the sample G2 which is the couple for which we are finding
a match.
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Figure 1: When do males and females work during the day? Part I
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Figure 2: When do males and females work during the day? Part II
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics working days & working hours
Males Freq. %
# working days
1 12 0.66
2 11 0.60
3 42 2.30
4 247 13.50
5 1,323 72.30
6 134 7.32
7 61 3.33
Total 1830 100
Average working hours (AWH) 44.21
Standard deviation AWH 11.44
Females Freq. %
# working days
1 48 2.62
2 231 12.62
3 512 27.98
4 425 23.22
5 530 28.96
6 39 2.13
7 45 2.46
Total 1830 100
Average working hours (AWH) 27.14
Standard deviation AWH 13.44
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Table 2: To what extent can you determine your starting (end-
ing) hours?
Freq. %
Males
Not at all/very difficult 690 37.70
Within boundaries but I have to report it up front 397 21.69
Within boundaries but I don’t have to report it up front 386 21.09
I can determine (almost) fully when I work during the day 357 19.51
Total 1830 100
Females
Not at all/very difficult 791 43.22
Within boundaries but I have to report it up front 512 27.98
Within boundaries but I don’t have to report it up front 279 15.25
I can determine (almost) fully when I work during the day 248 13.55
Total 1830 100
Table 3: Did you already had your job when you started living
together with your current partner?
Freq. %
Males
Yes 759 41.48
No 895 48.91
Non response 176 9.62
Total 1830 100
Females
Yes 559 30.55
No 1095 59.84
Non response 176 9.62
Total 1830 100
24
Table 4: Work time overlap regression
Variable β t-value
# Children between 0-4 -1.844∗∗∗ -4.69
# Children between 4-12 -1.709∗∗∗ -7.11
# Children between 12 plus -0.425∗ -1.65
Weekly work hours male 0.177∗∗∗ 8.86
Weekly work hours female 0.603∗∗∗ 32.70
Male had job before living together† 0.304 0.76
Female had job before living together† 0.320 0.75
Education level male 0.291∗∗ 2.23
Education level female 0.539∗∗∗ 3.87
Female works Monday 1.033∗∗ 2.23
Female works Tuesday 1.319∗∗∗ 2.83
Female works Wednesday 0.970∗∗ 2.25
Female works Thursday 0.657 1.42
Female works Friday 0.141 0.34
Female works Saturday -4.856∗∗∗ -7.34
Female works Sunday -8.037∗∗∗ -10.30
Male works Monday 4.441∗∗∗ 5.69
Male works Tuesday 2.490∗∗∗ 2.72
Male works Wednesday 3.248∗∗∗ 4.27
Male works Thursday 1.956∗∗ 2.23
Male works Friday 3.360∗∗∗ 4.96
Male works Saturday -1.120∗ -1.79
Male works Sunday -4.090∗∗∗ -4.82
Degree of working on flexible times male 0.908∗∗∗ 5.27
Degree of working on flexible times female 0.400∗∗ 2.23
Partners met each other at work (N=219)‡ 1.019 1.61
Partners met each other when going out(N=173)‡ -0.014 -0.02
Partners met each other through friends (N=317)‡ 0.898 1.61
Partners met each other through the internet (N=102)‡ -0.303 -0.34
Partners met each other somewhere else (N=446)‡ 0.572 1.13
Control† 2.326∗∗ 2.31
Constant -25.412∗∗∗ -15.79
Adjusted R2 0.687
#-obs. 1830
Note: ∗ significant at 10% level, ∗∗ significant at 5 % level, ∗∗∗ significant at 1
% level.
†The male/female question did you had your job before you started living to-
gether contain 179 missing values that are replaced to -1. Hence we included a
dummy variable control that is one for each -1-value and zero otherwise.
‡The reference group is partners met each other while going out (N=572).
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Table 6: Test if mean hours of work time overlap differ between the
couples and the control group
#-obs WTOCouples WTOControl ∆
Child present no 429 24.96 22.71 2.25∗∗∗
Children present between 0-4 yes 338 15.32 18.07 -2.75∗∗∗
Children present between 4-12 yes 592 15.92 18.34 -2.42∗∗∗
Children present between 12+ yes 471 17.94 19.20 -1.26∗∗∗
Education level male low 450 21.14 20.71 0.43
med. 881 20.42 20.45 -0.03
high 499 20.43 20.72 -0.28
Education level female low 310 17.62 18.56 -0.93∗∗∗
med. 1029 20.01 20.28 -0.28∗∗∗
high 491 23.90 22.64 1.26∗∗∗
Gross Household income low 424 18.98 19.67 -0.70∗∗∗
med. 701 20.22 20.47 -0.25∗∗∗
high 381 23.44 21.92 1.51∗∗∗
Job flexibility male very low 690 18.84 19.46 -0.63∗∗∗
low 397 19.69 20.37 -0.67∗∗∗
high 386 21.96 20.54 1.42∗∗∗
very high 357 23.56 23.07 0.50∗∗∗
Job flexibility female very low 791 19.20 20.17 -0.97∗∗∗
low 512 20.76 20.46 0.30∗∗∗
high 279 23.67 21.58 2.09∗∗∗
very high 248 21.30 21.07 0.23∗∗∗
Note: ∗ significant at 10% level, ∗∗ significant at 5 % level,
∗∗∗ significant at 1 % level.
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Table 7: How does coordination of work schedules influences the rela-
tive joint household time
#-obs WTOCouples WTOControl ∆
Type D Households
Relative joint 0-10 % 342 11.32 19.03 -7.72∗∗∗
household time 10-20 % 261 13.03 20.08 -7.05∗∗∗
20-30 % 139 13.54 20.56 -7.02∗∗∗
30-40 % 73 14.34 20.69 -6.35∗∗∗
40-50 % 66 14.42 19.78 -5.36∗∗∗
50-75 % 45 15.63 21.37 -5.74∗∗∗
75-100 % 49 12.75 20.17 -7.42∗∗∗
total observations 975
Type S Households
Relative joint 0-10 % 235 26.02 18.87 7.14∗∗∗
household time 10-20 % 195 28.48 21.31 7.17∗∗∗
20-30 % 160 29.53 21.30 8.23∗∗∗
30-40 % 88 32.91 23.48 9.43∗∗∗
40-50 % 63 31.84 23.81 8.03∗∗∗
50-75 % 53 37.51 24.17 13.34∗∗∗
75-100 % 61 31.80 23.86 7.94∗∗∗
total observations 855
Note: ∗ significant at 10% level, ∗∗ significant at 5 % level,
∗∗∗ significant at 1 % level.
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Table 8: How does coordination of work schedules influences the rela-
tive joint child caring time
#-obs WTOCouples WTOControl ∆
Type D Households
Relative joint 0-20 % 115 11.10 18.98 -7.88∗∗∗
child care hours 20-40 % 144 12.21 19.26 -7.05∗∗∗
40-60 % 83 12.05 19.41 -7.36∗∗∗
60-80 % 56 11.40 18.68 -7.28∗∗∗
80-100 % 102 11.29 19.69 -8.40∗∗∗
total observations 500
Type S Households
Relative joint 0-20 % 80 24.75 18.75 6.00∗∗∗
child care hours 20-40 % 83 25.24 18.12 7.12∗∗∗
40-60 % 58 24.70 20.20 4.49∗∗∗
60-80 % 29 25.76 15.86 9.89∗∗∗
80-100 % 83 25.76 18.61 7.14∗∗∗
total observations 333
Note: ∗ significant at 10% level, ∗∗ significant at 5 % level,
∗∗∗ significant at 1 % level.
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Table 9: How does coordination of work schedules influences the
amount of time that is spent with the partner
Variable β t-value
Type S Households
ˆ 0.001 0.070
# Children between 0-4 -0.531∗∗∗ -5.360
# Children between 4-12 -0.562∗∗∗ -8.760
# Children between 12 plus -0.433∗∗∗ -6.330
Education level male -0.170∗∗∗ -2.680
Education level female 0.069 1.060
Log(household income) 0.073 0.650
Control dummy 0.166 0.530
Constant 3.105∗∗∗ 10.180
Average weekly hours with partner 22.44
Type D Households
ˆ 0.012∗∗∗ 3.100
# Children between 0-4 -0.309∗∗∗ -4.540
# Children between 4-12 -0.549∗∗∗ -11.490
# Children between 12 plus -0.361∗∗∗ -6.610
Education level male -0.096∗ -1.850
Education level female 0.050 0.870
Log(household income) 0.108 1.350
Control dummy† 0.294 1.320
Constant 3.030∗∗∗ 13.480
Average weekly hours with partner 20.87
Household type S D
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.145
#-obs. 975 855
Note: ∗ significant at 10% level, ∗∗ significant at 5 % level, ∗∗∗ significant at 1
% level.
†The income question contains 331 missing values that are replaced to 0. Hence
we included a dummy variable control that is one for each 0-value and zero
otherwise.
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Table 10: How does coordination of work schedules influences the de-
mand of (in)formal child care
Variable β t-value
Dep. Var. log(tfcc)
Formal child care hourly price -0.601∗∗∗ -6.19
# Children between 0-4 0.882∗∗∗ 5.26
# Children between 4-12 -0.185 -0.60
Education level male -0.078 -0.50
Education level female 0.361∗ 1.83
Log(household income) -0.133 -0.46
ˆ 0.013∗ 1.72
Dummy uses formal + informal child care -0.460∗∗∗ -3.65
constant 4.735∗∗∗ 5.86
Dep. Var. log(ticc)
Informal child care hourly price -0.102 -1.58
# Children between 0-4 0.707∗∗∗ 5.21
# Children between 4-12 -0.749∗∗∗ -3.51
Education level male 0.306∗∗ 2.30
Education level female -0.336∗∗ -2.08
Log(household income) 0.195 0.61
ˆ 0.028∗∗∗ 4.34
Dummy uses formal + informal child care -0.261∗∗ -1.78
constant 2.291∗∗∗ 2.69
Dependent Variable log(tfcc) log(t
i
cc)
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.166
#-obs. 140 334
Note: ∗ significant at 10% level, ∗∗ significant at 5 % level, ∗∗∗ significant at 1
% level.
Table 11: Summary statistics for the demand of (in)formal child
care
Freq. Mean Min Max
Demand for formal child care 140 63.24 4 272
Demand for informal child care 334 28.41 1 168.5
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